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ABSTRACT 
Agricultural activities account for nearly a quarter of anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions mainly from deforestation and livestock, soil and nutrient 
management. Also it is the biggest emitter of non-carbon dioxide GHGs. Meanwhile 
farmers typically face more than one production possibility and they typically produce 
varying amounts of net GHG emissions at different costs. Therefore GHG emission 
reductions may be achieved by providing incentives for farmers to adopt alternative 
production activities. Intuitively, total GHG emissions will decrease after adopting lower 
emitting practices. However certain incentive designs might lead to GHG net emission 
increases or lower than expected reductions, hence unintended consequences. Here, two 
major forms of carbon market program are investigated for their effects on net GHG 
emissions and the conditions under which the unintended consequences occur are 
examined analytically. This model shows for net emitters the program design can lead to 
increased emissions – the rebound effect. While for negative emitters (those sequestering 
or offsetting emissions through bioenergy), the program results in trivial emission 
reductions. We also find that it is desirable to alter program design to limit participation 
to baseline levels for those who emit and to encourage participation well beyond 
baseline levels for those who generate negative emissions. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
GHG      Greenhouse Gas covering the 6 gasses in Kyoto Protocol – 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride 
CO2          Carbon Dioxide 
Non-CO2           Non Carbon Dioxide 
CH4          Methane 
N2O     Nitrous Oxide 
EPA          Environmental Protection Agency 
ERS USDA Economic Research Service United States Department of 
Agriculture 
UNFCCC          United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
IPCC          Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
INDCs          Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
ITMOs          Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes 
CARB          California Air Resources Board 
EIA          Energy Information Administration 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Establishing carbon markets is a widely discussed and, in cases, a widely 
implemented economic approach to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
certainly since its mention at the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997). “Carbon market” is 
the widely used generic name for a carbon-equivalent market covering the Kyoto GHGs 
of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. A carbon market will generally reward 
producers who can lower their emissions or increase their negative contribution to 
emissions, favoring those with low implementation costs, and will reflect the cost of 
emissions reductions across the economy. In the agricultural sector, farmers generally 
face production alternatives that alter GHG emissions at a cost (McCarl and Schneider, 
2000). Therefore, a carbon market can provide incentives for farmers to adopt less-net 
emissions-intensive practices. Theoretically, this would cause a reduction in total 
agricultural net carbon equivalent emissions. 
However, it is possible that in the face of incentives (depending on incentive 
design), adverse results might appear, with emissions increasing due to leakage 
(Searchinger et al, 2008, Fargione et al, 2008) or production increases. This 
counterintuitive consequence is referred to in the energy sector as the “rebound effect” 
(Gillingham et al, 2015).  Additionally program design may reduce incentives for 
sequestration activities or those providing lower emitting substitute products like 
biomass feedstocks for bioenergy. 
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Carbon markets have been controversial, with much negative attention occurring 
around the time of the Waxman Markey bill consideration (U.S. Congress 2009). In turn, 
many in the U.S. government have considered alternatives to a mandatory market in the 
form of voluntary programs (Price, 2005). One such voluntary program, developed 
based on current practices, would pay an incentive for a net reduction in emissions per 
acre, per animal emission, or per other unit as for example under the California rice 
protocol (CARB 2015a). We investigate this prospect herein and look at whether 
unintended consequences could be a problem, as well as investigate ways that policy 
design may be adopted to preclude it. 
More specifically, we will examine the adoption of net emissions-reducing and 
sequestration-enhancing practices in a theoretical carbon market where an incentive is 
paid for net reductions generated in agriculture. Furthermore, we will examine the 
performance of such a market under mandatory enrollment and voluntary enrollment. In 
the mandatory market setting, we will examine payments based on the total carbon offset 
amount. In the voluntary market setup, we look at payment for the difference between 
newly adopted practice and the practice used in the absence of a market. Each 
participation type (mandatory vs. voluntary) and associated incentive form will be 
examined in terms of net GHG emission offset amount. In the analysis, we will derive 
analytical conditions under which unintended consequences will occur and then explore 
market design elements that prevent such effects. We will also illustrate the findings in 
an empirical model. 
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The objective of this effort is to study cases where the voluntary market either 
worsens emissions or dampens emissions reductions compared to the mandatory market. 
This will be done by developing a simple economic model of the adoption of emissions-
reducing or offset/sequestration-enhancing strategies under voluntary and mandatory 
participation. And then within that model we will find conditions under which either the 
net emissions effect is dampened or can even turn into increases in a voluntary as 
opposed to a mandatory market. Finally, suggestions will be made on program design 
elements to avoid these problems. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the background 
of market forms and agricultural mitigation opportunities. Section 3 reviews the 
literature on economic incentives and GHG mitigation. Section 4 develops an economic 
model that will be used to study the conditions that cause lower emissions reductions 
(and even possibly increases) along with decreasing the incentives for participation for 
negative emitters.  Section 4 also presents potential program design elements that can 
improve the net emissions implications. Section 5 uses a simple mathematical 
programming model to empirically illustrate the findings. Section 6 discusses outcomes 
from the model and draws conclusions. 
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2. BACKGROUND
Agriculture can pursue a number of alternative practices that permit net 
emissions reductions. For the most part, these practices are already well known, but they 
are used to a limited extent because they cost more than current practices, meaning 
farmers need incentives to adopt them (Antle and McCarl, 2003). 
One way that could be used to implement economic incentives involves 
establishing a carbon market that allows those with high cost emissions reductions 
potential to purchase offsets from others who have lower cost emissions reductions or 
sequestration enhancement opportunities (IPCC 2014). In turn, it has been widely argued 
that this would result in agricultural producers receiving some form of payment 
incentive to reduce their emissions (Millar et al, 2010). 
The basic form of carbon market studied here is one that results in a price being 
offered for net agricultural emissions reductions. This price reflects the value that society 
places on reducing carbon emissions. In establishing the eligibility of strategies for 
payment, one important concept is additionality. In particular, in the Kyoto Protocol, the 
set goal is that the net emissions reductions paid for in a market should be additional to 
any that arise in the absence of the market. This means that net emissions-reducing 
practices that would be in place in the absence of a market are not eligible for payment. 
The payment is only for net emissions reductions that fall below a baseline amount. 
Two market forms will be used to reflect this baseline offset. Within the 
mandatory market, it is assumed that the emissions profile in the absence of the market 
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is observed and imposed as a baseline amount. In turn, any net emissions below that 
amount will be rewarded, while emissions above that amount will be penalized. In our 
modeling structure, we will impose a fixed baseline amount where we set the baseline 
amount as the total emissions from all sources in the absence of a program and will only 
pay for net emissions less than that amount. 
The second market form is a voluntary market. Under this form, net emissions 
reducers are required to do better than a norm for the region. If a farmer is producing 
rice under a mitigated rice production practice, the program will only pay for the 
increment that emissions using the new practice are less than the emissions from the 
common practices used for rice production in the absence of a market (hereafter called 
baseline practices). In this case, the GHG net emissions reductions eligible amount for 
payment is the emissions under the new practice minus the emissions under the baseline. 
Therefore, we need to form a baseline norm on a per-acre-of-rice basis, per unit of 
biofuel, per ton of manure, or per animal, depending on the enterprise. Then, the amount 
of money farmers receive will be the emissions rate under the improved practice minus 
the emissions rate under the baseline practice. 
Emissions under the mandatory program within the scope of the project area 
cannot exceed the emissions in the baseline because the extra production will be 
penalized. Naturally, this ignores leakage when the program only covers part of the 
globe and activities within the project area cause a production shift outside the area (see 
discussion in Murray et al, 2004). However, this is not the case under the voluntary 
program. In particular, if the payment from the program is high enough, it would 
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increase the amount of production under the net-emissions-reducing strategy. When the 
production level is well in excess of the amount produced in the baseline, the emissions 
per acre goes down, but the emissions in total can go up due to the expansion in 
production. This will be an outcome in our analytical model below for certain cases. 
There is also a possibility that the voluntary program will reduce incentives for 
negative emissions possibilities, like sequestration and bioenergy offsets. In particular, 
the current adoption of things like bioenergy for electricity production and afforestation 
is at relatively low levels. The voluntary program would pay for bioenergy emissions 
savings relative to the norm of bioenergy offsets in the region, and for sequestration the 
program would offer payment relative to the norm for say forest or tillage management 
in the region. Under the mandatory program, it would pay for the net emissions 
reductions from sequestration to the extent that it is less than the total amount 
sequestered in the baseline. This is a fixed number for the mandatory case and a per-acre 
amount for the voluntary program. Therefore, the voluntary program may not provide 
enough incentives to greatly expand the acreage to achieve greater net reductions from 
bioenergy or sequestration. This can limit the potential of the voluntary program to 
stimulate expansion of negative emitting strategies. This will also be explored in the 
analytical model. 
2.1 Background on Carbon Programs 
Carbon programs to encourage mitigation activities are the subject of recent 
policy actions. The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015) is an agreement that may lead to 
global carbon markets. The U.S. Clean Power Plan, which was recently finalized by the 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is a national carbon program focused on the 
electrical energy generating sector (U.S. EPA 2015) and may also cause markets to 
form. The cap-and-trade program in California is a state program that sets an emissions 
limit and covers 85% of state GHGs (CARB 2014) and offers a voluntary market. Here 
we will generally discuss these three programs. 
The recent Paris Agreement is a legally binding and universal agreement on 
climate mitigation through net GHG emissions reductions. As of now, it covers 96% of 
global emissions. It sets out a global action goal that aims to hold the global average 
temperature increase below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit 
it to 1.5°C. Countries that are parties to the agreement have submitted statements on 
actions their reductions aims in the form of Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) that are available through UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2015). In its 
INDC, China committed to peak its CO2 emissions around 2030 and reduce its CO2 
emissions per unit of GDP by 60 to 65% from the 2005 level by then. The U.S. INDC 
indicates that it intends to reduce its GHG emissions by 26 to 28% from the 2005 level 
by 2025. All the INDCs are to be updated every five years, becoming successively more 
ambitious. However, the Paris Agreement does not mention a binding enforcement 
mechanism to be triggered when a country fails to meet its INDC. Internationally 
Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) is another new terminology adopted in the 
agreement which stands for “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes”. The 
provision for ITMOs provides an international policy linkage which covers not only cap-
and-trade programs but also other nation mitigation policies. The use of ITMOs need to 
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promote environmental integrity and avoid double counting. The establishment of the 
international carbon market and markets for other tradable mitigation outcomes can be 
achieved through ITMOs in the future. The agreement also emphasized the importance 
of international market mechanism in enlarging mitigation potentials and achieving 
mitigation goals. 
The U.S. Clean Power Plan provides emissions reduction goals for existing, 
modified, and reconstructed power plants, which together account for almost 40% of 
U.S. CO2 emissions (U.S. EIA 2013). States are also required to develop their own plans 
to achieve these emissions reduction goals. The reduction goals are to be achieved 
through fuel switching, carbon market trading programs, increasing energy efficiency, 
retrofits, investing in renewable energy, and so on. The trading program can be designed 
based on either emissions rate (pounds of CO2 per megawatt hour) or emissions amount 
(tons of CO2). Under the rate-based trading system, power plants can trade emissions 
with other electricity resources to meet their assigned rate. Under the mass-based trading 
system, the EPA will distribute the allowances, which can be traded on the open market. 
This plan also covers pollutant precursors like sulfur dioxide (SO2) and N2O. 
The California cap-and-trade program is an essential part of California’s climate 
plan (CARB 2014), which aims to return to 1990 levels of GHG emissions by 2020. As 
mentioned in CARB (2014), the trading system started to allocate the caps for electricity 
generators in 2013 at 2% below their emissions levels in 2012. The distributers of 
transportation fuels, natural gas, and other fuels received their compliance obligations in 
2015. All caps declined 2% in 2014 and will decline 3% annually from 2015 to 2020. 
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Companies can enter a carbon market purchasing emissions rights from other emitting 
entities in order to meet their emissions obligation or can buy agricultural offsets. 
Agricultural offsets that are allowed have established protocols. Currently there are 
protocols for forest (CARB 2015b), animal manure treatment plus a recently proposed 
one for rice cultivation (CARB 2015a) that provides rice famers an opportunity to trade 
their credits earned from adopting GHG emission reducing practices. 
2.2 Background on Agricultural Mitigation Potential 
McCarl and Schneider (2000) argued there are three ways agriculture may 
participate in a carbon market. First, agriculture production has substantial GHG 
emissions, and farmers may adopt alternative management practices to reduce emissions 
of methane, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide. Second, agriculture may enhance its 
sequestration of atmospheric carbon dioxide by storing it in soils or standing vegetation 
(mainly trees). Third, agriculture may produce products that displace consumption of 
emissions-intensive products (mainly fossil fuels) and thus reduce emissions from those 
products. 
Each of these ways is discussed below with literature citations and indications of 
how they might interact in a voluntary or mandatory market. 
2.2.1 Source of emissions 
Agriculture, forestry, and land use change contribute significantly to GHG 
emissions (estimated at 24% of total global anthropogenic GHG emissions, IPCC 2014). 
The agricultural sector is the biggest non-CO2 emitter, accounting for an estimated 56% 
of global non-CO2 emissions in 2005 (U.S. EPA 2011). Within the agricultural sector, 
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paddy rice cultivation, manure management, and enteric fermentation are major sources 
of methane (CH4) emissions; fertilization and manure are major sources of nitrous oxide 
(N2O) emissions. 
Net emissions reductions can be achieved by adopting alternative farming 
practices (see discussion in McCarl and Schneider, 2000, 2001, Smith et al, 2008, IPCC 
2014). 
2.2.1.1 Carbon dioxide  
Contributions from agriculture across countries vary substantially, with large 
differences existing between tropical developing countries and developed countries with 
commercial agriculture. Deforestation and land degradation are two major sources of 
agricultural GHG emissions in developing countries, amounting to 17% of total GHG 
emissions in 2004 (IPCC 2007). The CO2 emitted from agricultural annual strategies 
(except that from deforestation) is considered neutral since it was absorbed during the 
year through photosynthesis and will thus is not treated here. 
Agricultural GHG emissions in developed countries are mainly caused by fossil 
fuel usage in production for tractors, irrigation pumping, and grain drying, among other 
sources, as well as by reductions in soil carbon through use of intense tillage or plowing 
grasslands. 
Reducing such emissions sources involves reducing use of tillage, agricultural 
machinery, and irrigation pumps; indirect emission reductions from production of 
fertilizers, needed transportation, and other inputs; and enhanced energy efficiency. 
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2.2.1.2 Methane 
Agricultural methane emissions largely involve rice cultivation, animal enteric 
fermentation, and manure management. For managing rice emissions, IPCC (2007) 
indicated that draining wetland rice during the growing season reduces the CH4
emissions. Other strategies include altering cultivars, improving offseason water 
management, keeping soil as dry as possible, increasing rice production per acre to 
enhance and reduce needed acres, adjusting the timing of organic residue additions, 
composting residues before incorporation, and producing biogas from residues before 
incorporation. 
Livestock management strategies also affect GHG emissions. Livestock 
operations emit about one-third of global anthropogenic methane emissions, with the 
primary vehicles being enteric fermentation and manure. For enteric fermentation, IPCC 
(2007) indicated that practices for reducing emissions from this source can be divided 
into three categories: improved feeding practices, adopting specific dietary additives, 
increasing productivity so less animals or shorter lifetimes are needed, and animal 
breeding. 
In terms of manure management, animal manures release significant amounts of 
non-CO2 GHGs, included N2O and CH4, during storage, but the emissions amount 
changes by manure handling system. Mitigation activities involve cooling, use of solid 
covers, mechanically separating solids from slurry, capturing emitted methane, using 
anaerobic digestion, handling manures in solid form, covering manure heaps, and 
altering feeding practices. 
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2.2.1.3 Nitrous oxide 
Nitrogen applied in fertilizers and manure, along with other sources, including 
fixation by legumes, are collectively a source of N2O emissions because plants generally 
do not capture all of the applied nitrogen. Mitigation strategies involve reducing leaching 
and volatilization losses, adjusting application rates based on precision farming, using 
slow or controlled-release fertilizer, using nitrification inhibitors, and avoiding excess 
nitrogen applications. 
2.2.2 Sequestration 
The second way to reduce agricultural GHG emissions is to increase carbon 
storage in the ecosystem. Every year carbon dioxide is absorbed from the atmosphere 
through photosynthesis and the carbon is stored in plants, but it is then released when the 
plants die. Sequestration can be enhanced by increasing retention of this material by 
enhancing roots, surface litter, or standing perennials like trees. Consequently, the 
inventory held in the soil or in standing vegetation can be increased in order to achieve a 
greater amount of sequestered carbon. This strategy is commonly mentioned as carbon 
sequestration. Carbon sequestration in terms of agriculture will be discussed in two 
forms: soil sequestration and standing vegetation. 
2.2.2.1 Soil sequestration 
Currently, U.S. agricultural soils hold eight billion metric tons of carbon (Kimble 
et al, 2002). Management practices that reduce soil disturbance generally result in more 
sequestered carbon. As mentioned in Lewandrowski et al. (2004), this includes residue 
management, less intensive tillage systems, increased use of winter cover strategies and 
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perennials, altered forest harvest practices, land conversion to grasslands or forest, and 
restoration of degraded soils. 
There is also the possibility of enhancing soil carbon sequestration through the 
application of biochar (discussed in McCarl et al, 2009). 
2.2.2.2 Standing vegetation sequestration 
Standing perennials hold a significant portion of carbon. For example, carbon 
constitutes approximately 50% of the dry mass of trees. Generally one accounts for 
carbon in standing vegetation that exists for more than one year. Vegetation that holds 
carbon for less than one year is not considered because on an annual basis it absorbs and 
releases the carbon. Thus, one strategy is to increase the inventory of standing trees, 
which also reduces soil disturbance and increases the inventory of carbon in the local 
soils. 
2.2.3 Providing substitute products 
The third way that agriculture could be involved in reducing net emissions 
involves providing substitutes for products whose usage causes substantial emissions. 
This involves growing specialized commodities or utilizing existing agricultural 
commodities as biomass feedstocks for bioenergy that replaces fossil fuel usage. It also 
includes increasing substitution of wood and other agricultural products for more GHG-
intensive building materials.  
2.2.3.1 Biomass for bioenergy 
Fossil fuels used in electrical generation or for liquid fuels can be substituted by 
agricultural products. In a power plant, it is possible to burn agricultural biomass in the 
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form of crop residues, energy strategies, or manure, among others to offset fossil fuel 
use. Burning biomass instead of fossil fuel would reduce net CO2 concentration into the 
atmosphere because of the photosynthetic process: about 95% of CO2 emitted when 
burning the biomass would be removed from the atmosphere during plant growth, 
meaning the carbon is being recycled (McCarl 2008b). It seems like a carbon-neutral 
process, but one must also consider the emissions from biomass production and 
transportation from field to electrical generation facility. EPA biogenic carbon 
documents discuss this (U.S. EPA 2011) and provide offset estimates, as does McCarl 
(2008a). 
Liquid fuel substitution is also possible by taking agricultural commodities and 
transforming them into conventional or cellulosic ethanol plus biodiesel, along with 
other possible energy forms like butanol. Again, this would create a carbon recycling 
process due to the carbon uptake during biomass growth. But one needs to go through 
the full production cycle using concepts like lifecycle assessment, as discussed in 
McCarl (2008b). 
2.2.3.2 Building products substitution 
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, buildings are responsible for 38% 
of carbon emissions. One can also employ an increased use of biomass products like 
wood in construction to offset emissions-intensive construction materials like concrete 
block or steel. Gustavsson et al. (2006) compared the CO2 emissions from wood-framed 
and concrete-framed buildings and showed that wood-framed construction involves less 
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GHG emissions and energy consumption. This benefit results from different emissions 
in production, transportation, and waste recovery of spent building materials. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Numerous policies have been suggested to enhance GHG mitigation through 
participation by the agricultural sector (Smith et al, 2008). A review of existing offset 
programs was provided by Kollmuss et al. (2010).
Smith et al. (2008) covered almost every mitigation option in agriculture and 
estimated their mitigation potentials. Water and rice management are important 
mitigation options. The mitigation practices of rice cultivation are discussed in detail. 
This paper also indicated that mitigation and adaptation may happen at the same time 
and interact with each other. 
McCarl and Schneider (2000) mentioned that markets for emissions trading 
should be an option when endeavoring to reduce GHG emissions. The results of 
reduction efforts remain uncertain; meanwhile, the potential negative externalities of 
policies include deforestation, additional use of pesticides, and competition with food 
and fiber production. 
Lobell et al. (2013) investigated investment in agriculture technologies and its 
climate-related co-benefits. They argued that the broad-based efforts to adapt agriculture 
to climate change can have mitigation co-benefits that are inexpensive relative to many 
mitigation-focused activities. Therefore, the programs and funds that support adaptation 
should not be treated as completely separate from mitigation ones. 
Smith et al. (2007) investigated the constraints and barriers faced by mitigation 
policies in agriculture. The barriers they discussed were permanence, additionality, 
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uncertainty, and leakage. Based on these issues, the actual level of GHG mitigation is far 
below the theoretical expectation. 
Lutsey and Sperling (2008) focused on regional mitigation policies and their 
effect on national emissions goals. Their paper argued that sub-national action should 
dominate since local governments are more responsible and knowledgeable about local 
environment. They indicated that cooperation and interaction between sub-national 
governments on mitigation policies would be helpful for us to understand the worldwide 
emissions market. But whether the global emissions market will evolve or not is still 
uncertain. 
Antle and McCarl (2003) discussed incentive design of mitigation policies. 
Direct government payment and private market are two alternative options for incentive. 
For soil carbon sequestration programs, if government provides the incentive based on 
numbers of hectare, then extra monitoring cost needs to be considered. If the payment is 
provided based on the amount of carbon mitigated, additional studies on soil carbon 
status are crucial to the program. The spatial heterogeneity will diminish the policy 
efficiency if the payment is designed based on only the activities. On the other side, the 
payment mechanism based on amount of carbon will be too expensive to implement. 
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4. AN ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION OF MARKET DESIGN
A broad understanding of potential unintended consequences in net emissions 
response under the alternative carbon market forms and possible policy designs can be 
developed using an analytical model. Here we use a relatively simple analytical model to 
examine cases where reactions to a market may generate both greater net emissions than 
the without-market case and substantially less negative sequestration and offsets than 
under the mandatory case. We will also posit policy design procedures to avoid such 
difficulties; we will develop this in several stages. 
4.1 Basic Analytical Model—No Carbon Market 
Assume a producer maximizes profits when choosing between two technologies, 
the commonly used baseline approach, 𝑥1, and a more costly net-emissions-reducing 
alternative, 𝑥2. In the absence of a carbon market, we assume the producer solves the 
following optimization problem: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥    𝜋 = (𝑝𝑥1 + 𝑝𝑥2) − 𝑥1𝐶1(𝑥1) − 𝑥2𝐶2(𝑥2)
s.t.     𝑥1𝑥2 = 0 
       𝑥1, 𝑥2 ≥ 0 
where 𝑥1 is the baseline strategy used. By assumption, 𝑥1 has lower cost but 
higher emissions than the new previously unused alternative, 𝑥2. Both alternatives 
produce the same amount of output. Assume that 𝑝 is the per-unit revenue from that 
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output. Additionally, 𝐶𝑖(𝑥𝑖) is the cost function of producing 𝑥𝑖. The constraint implies
that farmers adopt either 𝑥1 or 𝑥2 but not both of them. 
In setting up the model, we will use a linear, increasing cost function for 
producing more of 𝑥𝑖. 
𝐶𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝑐2 > 𝑐1 
𝑝 − 𝑐𝑖 > 0;   𝑑 > 0 
where 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑑 are positive constants, with the cost of 𝑥2 exceeding that of 𝑥1 
due to 𝑐2 being greater than 𝑐1 and, for simplicity, the costs under the two alternatives 
both rising at the same rate (𝑑) with activities. 
If we optimize this with calculus, we arrive at the solution for the baseline that 𝑥1 
is produced and 𝑥2 is not. 
𝑥1
∗ =
𝑝 − 𝑐1
2𝑑
𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑥2
∗ = 0
In this case, when 𝑒𝑖 denotes the net emissions from the use of 𝑥𝑖, the total net 
carbon emission, 𝐸𝐵∗, in the absence of a carbon market is:
𝐸𝐵∗ =
𝑒1(𝑝 − 𝑐1)
2𝑑
This will be the baseline amount under the absence of carbon market and e1 will 
be the per unit performance standard that the market must do better than under the 
voluntary market. 
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4.2 Adding a Mandatory Carbon Market 
Now suppose we examine the consequences of adding a carbon market under a 
mandatory program (where all are assumed to participate). In that case, the model 
becomes the following: 
𝜋 = (𝑝𝑥1 + 𝑝𝑥2) − 𝑥1𝐶1(𝑥1) − 𝑥2𝐶2(𝑥2) − 𝑀(𝐸 − 𝐸𝐵
∗)
s.t.     𝐸 = 𝑥1𝑒1 +  𝑥2𝑒2 
𝑥1𝑥2 = 0 
 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ≥ 0 
where 𝑀 is the carbon price,  𝐸 is the total emissions under the coice of the 𝑥𝑖, 
and 𝐸𝐵∗ is the baseline emissions quantity, as previously defined.
Under this policy setting, the production strategy will change due to the carbon 
price when the revenue from carbon market sales compensates for the difference in cost 
between the new and baseline technologies. If not, they will continue using the baseline 
technology. 
So we have 𝑥1,𝑚
∗  being produced when the carbon price is low.
𝑥1,𝑚
∗ =
𝑝 − 𝑐1 − 𝑀𝑒1
2𝑑
 ;  𝑥2,𝑚
∗ = 0     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑀 <
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
And 𝑥2,𝑚
∗  will be produced instead of 𝑥1,𝑚
∗  when the carbon price increases above
the critical value. 
𝑥2,𝑚
∗ =
𝑝 − 𝑐2 − 𝑀𝑒2
2𝑑
;  𝑥1,𝑚
∗ = 0     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
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Here, we need to add an assumption that 𝑑 < min (|𝑀𝑒1|, |𝑀𝑒2|, |𝑀(𝑒2 − 𝑒1)|).
Otherwise the incentive from program can not compensate the increase in production 
cost which means the program will have no influence on farmers’ decisions. 
Farmers will reduce their production levels of 𝑥1 when the carbon price 𝑀 is 
positive and will receive a payment for that reductions while producing 𝑥1 when the 
carbon payment is not large enough to cause the shift to 𝑥2. 𝑥2 will also decline as the 
carbon price increases above the critical level. Therefore, this program will achieve 
emissions reductions across the spectrum of carbon prices. The emissions level given the 
optimal choice of 𝑥𝑖 is: 
𝐸𝑚
∗ = 𝑒1𝑥1,𝑚
∗ + 𝑒2𝑥2,𝑚
∗
Also, the reductions level, 𝐸𝐵∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ , can be calculated by substituting 𝐸𝑚
∗  with
the expressions from above, given 𝑥1,𝑚
∗  and 𝑥2,𝑚
∗ . So we have the reduction level under
low carbon price as: 
𝐸𝐵∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ =
𝑀𝑒1
2
2𝑑
 ;     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑀 <
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
And the reduction level under the high carbon price is: 
𝐸𝐵∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ =
(𝑝 − 𝑐1)(𝑒1−𝑒2) + 𝑒2(𝑐2 − 𝑐1 + 𝑀𝑒2)
2𝑑
 ;     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
So compared with the no-carbon-market scenario, a net emissions reductions will 
occur with a mandatory program regardless of carbon price for positive emitting 
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strategies because 𝑀, 𝑑 and 𝑒2 are positive. For strategies generating negative emission, 
we will discuss this issue later. 
4.3 Voluntary Program 
The prospect of implementing a mandatory carbon market has not been well 
received politically in the US, as evidenced by the cap-and-trade discussion (Lyon 
2003). Thus, some have suggested that a voluntary market might be implemented. As 
discussed above, the form we study is that producers may be paid to join a market if they 
can reduce emissions relative to prior practices, and they will be paid according to the 
difference. Analytically, this leads to a model of the form: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥      𝜋 = (𝑝𝑥1 + 𝑝𝑥2) − 𝑥1𝐶1(𝑥1) − 𝑥2𝐶2(𝑥2) − 𝑀[(𝑥1(𝑒1 − 𝑒
𝑏) + 𝑥2(𝑒2 − 𝑒
𝑏) ]
s.t.     𝑥1𝑥2 = 0 
        𝑥1, 𝑥2 ≥ 0 
where 𝑒𝑏 is the baseline emissions per unit of production that voluntary or
opting-in producers must achieve if they wish to receive payment. In this case, producers 
only get paid if their net emissions level is less than the baseline emissions level, so we 
set 𝑒𝑏 = 𝑒1. In turn, continuing to use 𝑥1 yields no carbon market payments, while using
𝑥2 results in revenue from a payment equaling, 𝑀𝑥2(𝑒1 − 𝑒2). Therefore, the optimal 
choices under low carbon price are: 
𝑥1,𝑣
∗ =
𝑝 − 𝑐1
2𝑑
;  𝑥2,𝑣
∗ = 0    𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 <
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
23 
And the production levels under high carbon price are: 
𝑥2,𝑣
∗ =
𝑝 − 𝑐2 − 𝑀(𝑒2 − 𝑒1)
2𝑑
;  𝑥1,𝑣
∗ = 0     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
In this case, farmers voluntarily enter the program using 𝑥2 , the new emissions-
reducing technology, if 𝑀 exceeds the above threshold.  
So now let us look at how emissions levels are affected by payments under the 
voluntary program (note emissions are constant when producing 𝑥1 and the net amount 
of payment is zero because this does not involve market participation). The resultant 
emissions above the threshold for 𝑥2 are: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ =
𝑒2[𝑝 − 𝑐2 − 𝑀(𝑒2 − 𝑒1)]
2𝑑
where 𝐸𝑣
∗ is the emissions under participation in the voluntary program. We can
see from the equation above that the emissions are positive correlated with carbon price 
for positive emitting strategies which means 𝑒2 > 0 and negative correlated for 
strategies generating negative emissions. 
Now suppose we examine the size of the net emissions relative to those in the no-
carbon-market case. Here we will derive the difference and substitute 𝑐2 with 𝑐1 + ∆𝑐 
and 𝑒2 with 𝑒1 + ∆𝑒. 
𝐸𝑣
∗ =
(𝑒1 + ∆𝑒)[𝑝 − (𝑐1 + ∆𝑐) − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
Further expand the formula and we get: 
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𝐸𝑣
∗ =
𝑒1[𝑝 − (𝑐1 + ∆𝑐) − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
+
∆𝑒[𝑝 − (𝑐1 + ∆𝑐) − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
In order to compare 𝐸𝑣
∗ with 𝐸𝐵∗, we divide the first term into two parts as
follows: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ =
𝑒1(𝑝 − 𝑐1)
2𝑑
+
𝑒1[−∆𝑐 − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
+
∆𝑒[𝑝 − (𝑐1 + ∆𝑐) − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
By subtracting 𝐸𝐵∗ from both sides, we can drive the reduction levels.
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝐵∗ =
𝑒1[−∆𝑐 − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
+
∆𝑒[𝑝 − (𝑐1 + ∆𝑐) − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
In order to analyze the program effect on positive emitting strategies, meaning 
𝑒1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒2 > 0 , we need to dig deeper. Here we substitute 𝑒1 with 𝑒2 − ∆𝑒 in the 
equation above. 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝐵∗ =
(𝑒2 − ∆𝑒)[−∆𝑐 − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
+
∆𝑒[𝑝 − (𝑐1 + ∆𝑐) − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
After simplify the equation we can get: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝐵∗ =
−𝑒2∆𝑐 + ∆𝑒(𝑝 − 𝑐1) − ∆𝑒𝑀𝑒2
2𝑑
Now we can solve the range of 𝑀 by assuming the left hand side is positive. 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝐵∗ > 0     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛     𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
+
𝑝 − 𝑐1
𝑒2
From this we can see that the voluntary program payment can have a counter 
effect causing a total emissions increase above the baseline level. The last equation 
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indicates that when 𝑀 is larger than the amount to stimulate production of 𝑥2 by 
𝑝−𝑐1
𝑒2
, 
the extra emissions from producing 𝑥2, which is 𝑥2𝑒2, will make the total emissions 
exceed the baseline level. This extra emission offsets the emissions savings from the 
difference between the two alternatives. And we can show this by first driving the 
derivative of 𝑀 over 𝐸𝑣
∗ as:
𝜕𝐸𝑣
∗
𝜕𝑀
=
𝑒2(𝑒1−𝑒2)
2𝑑
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
Here we can express the changes in emissions as a function of changes in carbon 
price. 
∆𝐸𝑣
∗ = ∆𝑀
𝜕𝐸𝑣
∗
𝜕𝑀
Now we know the condition of carbon price under which the additional 
emissions offset the mitigation effect from adopting 𝑥2 strategy. 
∆𝐸𝑣
∗ > 𝑥1
∗(𝑒1−𝑒2)   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    ∆𝑀 >
𝑝 − 𝑐1
𝑒2
∆𝐸𝑣
∗ is the increment of emissions which equals the product of the increment of
𝑀 and the derivative of 𝑀 over 𝐸𝑣
∗ since the emission amount can be expressed as a
linear function of 𝑀. Therefore we can derive the last equation above and see that the 
extra emission from production increase will offset the emission reductions achieved by 
switching production alternatives. So the voluntary program will cause the rebound 
effect if carbon price meets the condition above. 
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Additionally, suppose we compare the voluntary program with the mandatory 
program. We can derive the reductions level rather simply. Under the high carbon price 
situations the reduction level is: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ =
𝑀𝑒1𝑒2
2𝑑
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
When the carbon price is lower than the critical value, the reduction level is: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ =
𝑀𝑒1
2
2𝑑
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 <
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
It is highly unlikely that 𝑒1 > 0 and 𝑒2 < 0 for a crop, so 𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗  is non
negative at all carbon prices for all strategies. Therefore the voluntary program will 
certainly bring a lower level of emissions reductions than the mandatory program. The 
numerical exploration below will further illuminate this result. 
4.4 Results for Strategies Generating Negative Emissions 
When producing emission reducing substitute products or enhancing 
sequestration, there will be baseline and alternative strategies that generate negative 
emissions. This merits examination in terms of whether or not the voluntary program 
affects the potential adoption of such technologies and the amount of negative offset 
achievable. 
Based on the previous analysis, we know that the emission difference between 
the mandatory program setup and the no carbon market scenario can be expressed as 
follows for low carbon price. 
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𝐸𝐵∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ =
𝑀𝑒1
2
2𝑑
 ;     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑀 <
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
And for a high carbon price, the difference is: 
𝐸𝐵∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ =
(𝑝 − 𝑐1)(𝑒1−𝑒2)
2𝑑
+
𝑒2(𝑐2 − 𝑐1 + 𝑀𝑒2)
2𝑑
 ;     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
It is easy to see from the first equation that the mandatory program will achieve 
emission reductions when carbon price is below the critical value. For strategies 
generating negative emissions, we can further examine the second equation and draw 
conclusions. 
Since 𝑀 >
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
 and 𝑒2 < 0, we can multiply 𝑒2 on both sides of the condition 
over 𝑀 and get: 
 𝑀𝑒2 <
𝑐2𝑒2 − 𝑐1𝑒2
𝑒1−𝑒2
which is the revenue to program participation. If we add in the cost difference, the net 
revenue implications are: 
𝑐2 − 𝑐1 + 𝑀𝑒2 <
𝑒1(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)
𝑒1−𝑒2
Because of 𝑒1 > 𝑒2, 𝑐2 > 𝑐1 and 𝑒1 < 0, and we know that the right hand side of 
the equation above is negative. Therefore the left hand side must also be negative and if 
we multiply it by 
𝑒2 
2𝑑
 we can see that:
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𝑒2(𝑐2 − 𝑐1 + 𝑀𝑒2)
2𝑑
> 0 
This term above is a part of emissions reductions under mandatory program and 
it is increasing as 𝑀 grows. 
𝐸𝐵∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ =
(𝑝 − 𝑐1)(𝑒1−𝑒2)
2𝑑
+
𝑒2(𝑐2 − 𝑐1 + 𝑀𝑒2)
2𝑑
 ;     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
Since 
(𝑝−𝑐1)(𝑒1−𝑒2)
2𝑑
> 0, now we can draw the conclusion that 𝐸𝐵∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ > 0 for
strategies generating negative emission at all carbon prices. The mandatory program will 
encourage the production of emission reducing substitute products and will enhance the 
adoption of the negative emissions strategies. Also the mandatory program will reduce 
more and more emissions as the carbon price keep increases. 
For strategies generating negative emissions, the implementation of the voluntary 
program will also lead to emission reductions. Based on the previous analysis on the 
voluntary program we know that: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝐵∗ =
𝑒1[−∆𝑐 − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
+
∆𝑒[𝑝 − (𝑐1 + ∆𝑐) − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
We can apply 𝑥2,𝑣
∗ =
𝑝−𝑐2−𝑀(𝑒2−𝑒1)
2𝑑
 here and get the following: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝐵∗ =
𝑒1[−∆𝑐 − 𝑀(∆𝑒)]
2𝑑
+ 𝑥2,𝑣
∗ (∆𝑒)
Here ∆𝑒 is negative so the second term on the right-hand side is negative. We 
also know that participation in the program requires the condition 𝑀 >
∆𝑐
−∆𝑒
 . So if 𝑒1 < 0 
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which is the case for a negative emitting strategy, the voluntary program will reduce 
total emissions compared with the no carbon market scenario when carbon price is above 
the critical value. When the carbon price is not high enough and farmers choose not to 
participate in the program, no payment will be made and the emissions will remain 
unchanged under the voluntary program.  
To compare the voluntary program and mandatory program for negative emitting 
strategies, we can use the equations we derived before for the difference in emissions 
between the voluntary (𝐸𝑣
∗) and mandatory (𝐸𝑚
∗ ) programs. The differences in emissions 
under the high carbon price are: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ =
𝑀𝑒1𝑒2
2𝑑
   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
 
When the carbon price is low, the differences are: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ =
𝑀𝑒1
2
2𝑑
   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 <
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
 
It is clear that the total emission reducing effects of the mandatory program is 
larger (in a negative sense) than that of the voluntary program  𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝑚
∗ ≥ 0 at all 
carbon prices. Also note that the emissions difference is a linear function of 𝑀 which 
means as the carbon price increases that the gap between two programs expands 
proportionally. Therefore when the carbon price is large, especially above the critical 
value, this gap can be large which means that the voluntary program can bring far less 
emission reductions.  
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We can also see how the voluntary program under these assumptions dampens 
participation by examining the effects on the level of 𝑥2 under the two programs. 
Under the mandatory program the production of 𝑥2 equals to the following: 
𝑥2,𝑚
∗ =
𝑝 − 𝑐2 − 𝑀𝑒2
2𝑑
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
While under the voluntary program it equals to: 
𝑥2,𝑣
∗ =
𝑝 − 𝑐2 − 𝑀(𝑒2 − 𝑒1)
2𝑑
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
And the differences are: 
𝑥2,𝑚
∗ − 𝑥2,𝑣
∗ =
−𝑀𝑒1
2𝑑
Here note since 𝑒1 is negative and 𝑀 and 𝑑 are positive, the voluntary program
stimulates less production of 𝑥2 than does the voluntary program. Notice here, the gap 
between productions of 𝑥2 is also a function of 𝑀 so the gap rises as the carbon price 
rises. 
We can also conclude that while the voluntary program reduces net total 
emissions compared to the no carbon market case it does not do this as much as the 
mandatory program. 
4.4.1 A payment design for negative emitting strategies 
Another issue we need to discuss is payment design. For people who create 
negative emissions, payments based on emissions status improvement, which is 𝑒1−𝑒2, 
may not be enough to lead to a production increase (where 𝑥2 is substantially greater 
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than the without market optimal 𝑥1
∗). Here we may want to design the program to enlarge
the support for negative emitting strategies that are implemented above the baseline 
levels resulting in a greater effect on the amount of net emissions reductions. In order to 
avoid making too many changes for the model, we add a variable for the amount of 𝑥2 
beyond the baseline amount of 𝑥1 and call this 𝑥3 in turn setting the model as follows for 
the negative emitting voluntary case: 
𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3) − 𝑥1𝐶1(𝑥1) − (𝑥2 + 𝑥3)𝐶2(𝑥2 + 𝑥3) − 𝑀(𝑥2(𝑒2 − 𝑒1 ) + 𝑥3𝑒2)
s. t.    𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ≥ 𝑥1
∗
Here, both 𝑥2 and 𝑥3 are mitigation practices that have less emissions and higher 
cost. 𝑥1
∗ is the production level achieved without any program payment. And 𝑥3
represents production from the land that is not used for 𝑥1 or 𝑥2 initially. This is 
equivalent to setting 𝑒𝑏, the per unit offset, to zero for additional negative emitter 
production beyond the baseline level. In other words, if farmers decide to further expand 
their production well beyond the levels they produced in the baseline for negative 
emitting strategies, they will receive payment based on the additional amount of 
emissions offset for production beyond the baseline amount. The constraint we added 
here makes sure that only the additional production will receive full payment and that 
farmers will only be paid for the offset improvement they generate for the production 
amount that was in the original baseline. Namely, each unit of 𝑥2 is paid 𝑀(𝑒2 − 𝑒1), but 
this payment rate only covers up to the baseline amount, 𝑥1
∗. For production in addition
to 𝑥1
∗, which is 𝑥3, the payment rate is 𝑀𝑒2. The reason we split the mitigation practice
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into two parts is that we can easily implement constraints to prevent the production 
dampening amount that stops expansion beyond the 𝑥1
∗ amount.
Under this payment setting, the negative emitters receive bigger incentives for 
additional production that is larger than the no-program amount. Since 𝑥2 is less 
attractive than 𝑥3 in the objective function and we have a minimum requirement for it, 
𝑥2 will remain constant at its lower bound of 𝑥1
∗ when the mitigation practice is adopted.
Also the per-unit emission is negative, so we do not need to worry about the expansion 
of total emissions. As always, the optimal solution for 𝑥2 and 𝑥3 in this setting changes 
based on the carbon price. When the carbon price is below the critical value: 
𝑥1,𝑠
∗ = 𝑥1
∗ ;    𝑥2,𝑠
∗ = 0 ;   𝑥3,𝑠
∗ = 0  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑀 < 𝐴
When the carbon price is above the critical value: 
𝑥1,𝑠
∗ = 0 ;     𝑥2,𝑠
∗ = 𝑥1
∗ ;     𝑥3,𝑠
∗ =
𝑐1 − 𝑐2 − 𝑀𝑒2
2𝑑
     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑀 > 𝐴
where 𝐴 is the critical value of carbon price above which the mitigation practices 
will be adopted. The critical value here is smaller than what we have seen before 
because the payment for additional negative offsets is larger for 𝑥2 and 𝑥3. The closed-
form expression for 𝐴 is intricate, so we just qualitatively discuss it here. A numerical 
example will be demonstrated later where the value of 𝐴 is calculated. 
Here the emission levels are: 
𝐸𝑣,𝑠
∗ =
𝑒2(𝑝 − 𝑐2 − 𝑀𝑒2)
2𝑑
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 > 𝐴 
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4.4.2 A special case where there is no new technology 
A special case may be considered where the participating technology is basically 
the same as that in the baseline and thus 𝑒2 is about the same as 𝑒1. This strategies case 
creates a substantial difference if we don’t have the design above that involves 𝑥3. In 
particular there is very little space for the negative strategies producers to further 
enhance their performance but if they would expand production substantially then net 
emissions would fall. 
Here we examine the case where the emissions under the technologies are 
essentially the same. 
𝑒1 − 𝑒2 → 0 
Under this case the critical value of carbon price will be very large and will lead 
to no voluntary participation and no gain in total net emissions reduction. In particular 
the critical price is: 
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
→ ∞ 
In that case the alternative practice will likely never be adopted which means 
only 𝑥1 is produced and emissions reduction is zero. Even when the carbon price rises 
above the critical value, here we only get the emissions reductions as follows: 
𝐸𝑣
∗ − 𝐸𝐵∗ →
𝑒2(𝑐1 − 𝑐2)
2𝑑
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛    𝑀 >
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
However under the voluntary program with special payment design, we can 
achieve emissions reductions at the same price range as follows: 
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𝐸𝑣,𝑠
∗ − 𝐸𝐵∗ =
(𝑝 − 𝑐1)(𝑒2−𝑒1) − 𝑀𝑒2
2 + 𝑒2(𝑐1 − 𝑐2)
2𝑑
Apply the assumption made above and we can further get: 
𝐸𝑣,𝑠
∗ − 𝐸𝐵∗ →
𝑒2(𝑐1 − 𝑐2) − 𝑀𝑒2
2
2𝑑
The formula above shows that the emission reductions under the special payment 
design is a linear function of carbon price. So as 𝑀 increases the emission reductions rise 
as well. Meanwhile we need to notice the fact that the original voluntary program which 
pays for the emissions improvement achieves almost zero emission reduction under the 
same assumption. 
The reason for this difference is the emission brought by 𝑥3 which equals to: 
𝑥3,𝑠
∗ 𝑒2 =
𝑒2(𝑐1 − 𝑐2 − 𝑀𝑒2)
2𝑑
This term is negative and its absolute value increases as 𝑀 increases which 
means more emission reductions can be achieved as carbon price rises. Since 𝑥3 was 
defined as the production from land that was not used for 𝑥1 or 𝑥2, the voluntary 
program with special payment design is able to bring new land into production of 
negative emitting strategies. For reforestation and biofuel production there is typically 
not much of an option available to further improve the mitigation performance on the 
land that are already covered by forest or used for biomass production and the baseline 
levels of these activities may be quite small. Therefore emission improvement potential 
is small and as we showed before the original voluntary program cannot cause much 
changes. On the other hand, the special payment design can convert additional land into 
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forest or encourage farmers to produce additional biomass. We will revisit this 
significant effect on the negative emitting strategies in the empirical model later. 
4.5 Program Constraints 
It is possible that program designs can be altered to avoid the unintended 
consequences of emissions increases and lower levels of negative offset potential. In 
particular, for an emitter, one needs to limit the eligible amount of the improved practice 
to its baseline amount. For a producer of negative emissions, one needs to enhance the 
production eligible for payment. To achieve these goals, we can implement production 
constraints or carbon price constraints. 
4.5.1  Price constraint 
 For the price constraint, we already know that total emissions will increase if: 
𝑀 >  
𝑝 − 𝑐1
𝑒2
+
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
So we can add to the model that: 
𝑀 <  
𝑝 − 𝑐1
𝑒2
+
𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑒1−𝑒2
It is theoretically acceptable, and we need to estimate the fixed cost under each 
technology that might be costly or infeasible in practice. The shadow price on this 
constraint, if is not zero, measures the changes in farmer income if the carbon price 
changes by one unit.  
4.5.2 Production constraint 
Adding a constraint on production level is much easier. We can impose a 
constraint in the program as follows: 
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𝑥2 ≤
𝑝 − 𝑐1
2𝑑
Here we do not allow the production level to expand beyond the baseline level 
that it should achieve without program support. Therefore, the program will not pay for 
extra production level and total emissions will not increase. The only issue is that this 
constraint will impede the production of negative emitting strategies. So we need further 
add that: 
𝑥2 ≤
𝑝 − 𝑐1
2𝑑
      𝑓𝑜𝑟      𝑒2 > 0 
It is also possible to add constraints that take care of negative emitters in the 
program. We can impose a constraint to prevent production from decreasing. If strategy 
𝑥1 will be adopted, we can impose a minimum requirement equals to its baseline 
production amount. 
𝑥1 ≥
𝑝 − 𝑐1
2𝑑
 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑀 <
𝑐1 − 𝑐2
𝑒2−𝑒1
 𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑒2 < 0 
If strategy 𝑥2 is chose, we can also add a lower bound as follows: 
 𝑥2 ≥
𝑝 − 𝑐2
2𝑑
      𝑓𝑜𝑟       𝑀 >
𝑐1 − 𝑐2
𝑒2−𝑒1
     𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑒2 < 0 
The combination of production constraints and special payment for negative 
emitting strategies involves a slight change in the model structure. We can adjust the 
model as follows for the voluntary program: 
𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3) − 𝑥1𝐶1(𝑥1) − (𝑥2 + 𝑥3)𝐶2(𝑥2 + 𝑥3) − 𝑀(𝑥2(𝑒2 − 𝑒1 ) + 𝑥3𝑒2)
s. t.  𝑥2  ≤  
𝑝 − 𝑐1
2𝑑
 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ≥
𝑝 − 𝑐1
2𝑑
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𝑥1𝑥2 = 0 
𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 ≥ 0 
As we discussed in the special payment section, 𝑥2 and 𝑥3 are production under 
mitigation practices. The first constraint limits production of 𝑥2, so a rebound effect will 
not take place if the strategies have positive emissions. The second constraint provides a 
minimum production requirement that equals the baseline amount and will force the 
non-additional activity to be as big as the baseline amount. The third and fourth 
constraints rule out the possibility that both alternatives are adopted. Together, the first 
three constraints make sure that at least one of 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 will be produced at the baseline 
amount. For the positive emitters, 𝑥3 will be zero because it has a negative coefficient in 
the objective function. For strategies with negative emissions, if the mitigation practices 
are adopted, producing 𝑥3 will receive larger incentives and there is no limit on the 
production level. 
This modification encourages farmers to expand their production on strategies 
with negative emissions and causes the production of positive emitting strategies to only 
get incentives if the production is at or below the baseline amount, regardless which 
technology they choose precluding the unintended consequences. 
4.6 A Multi-Strategies Model 
It is possible to derive a multi-strategies model for the program, but it requires 
additional constraints to draw conclusions. So it is not helpful to set up an objective 
function for the general case. However, discussion of a special case will benefit our 
understanding of the potential effects of the program. 
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The issue we wish to clarify here is the possible shift from energy strategies to 
positive emitting strategies under an incentive from the program after previous changes. 
In other words, farmers who should have planted energy strategies will choose to 
cultivate positive emitting strategies, like rice, in order to receive payment from the 
program. It is possible that total emissions will increase dramatically. Here we set up an 
objective function: 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝐴(𝑥1 + 𝑥2) − 𝑥1𝐶1(𝑥1) − 𝑥2𝐶2(𝑥2) − 𝑀[𝑥1(𝑒1 − 𝑒2) ]
𝑜𝑝𝑡
+𝑝𝐵(𝑥3 + 𝑥4) − 𝑥3𝐶3(𝑥3) − 𝑥4𝐶4(𝑥4) − (𝑀𝐸𝐵) 
𝑜𝑝𝑡
Crop 𝐵 is an energy crop, and crop 𝐴 is emitting crop. 𝑝𝐴 and 𝑝𝐵 are the prices of 
two strategies. 𝑥3 and 𝑥4 are productions of crop 𝐵 under traditional and emission-
mitigated technologies, respectively. 𝐸𝐵 is the total emissions from crop 𝐵, and 𝑜𝑝𝑡 is a 
binary variable that only takes the value of one or zero, providing an easy way to set up 
the voluntary program. Here we have the same assumption for both strategies as we did 
before. Therefore, we add together the income from two strategies to analyze this issue. 
Based on the background information, it is reasonable to assume that emitting 
strategies are more profitable than energy strategies, and the emissions improvement for 
crop 𝐴 is less than the total emissions amount for crop 𝐵. So we have the following 
conditions: 
𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐1 < 𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐4 
𝑒2 − 𝑒1 > 𝑒3 
𝑒1, 𝑒2 > 0      𝑎𝑛𝑑    𝑒3, 𝑒4 < 0 
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To avoid unnecessary work, we can further assume that 𝑐1 − 𝑐2 = 𝑐3 − 𝑐4, which 
means switching between technologies cost the same for both strategies. So we can 
derive that 
𝑐1 − 𝑐2
𝑒2−𝑒1
 <  
𝑐3 − 𝑐4
𝑒4−𝑒3
The two quantities above are the two critical values for carbon price. If carbon 
price is less than 
𝑐1−𝑐2
𝑒2−𝑒1
 , farmers will choose the traditional technology for both 
strategies. If carbon price is larger than 
𝑐3−𝑐4
𝑒4−𝑒3
 , farmers will adopt advanced technology. 
Since the advanced technology has a higher cost, we can conclude that if there exists a 
carbon price that makes crop 𝐴 more profitable than crop 𝐵, it must lie between these 
two critical values. We are finding a carbon price that makes planting crop 𝐴 with 
advanced technology worth more than planting crop 𝐵 traditionally. Therefore, the 
carbon price will have the following boundaries: 
(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐4) − (𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐1)
𝑒4 − (𝑒1−𝑒2)
 < 𝑀 <
𝑐3 − 𝑐4
𝑒4−𝑒3
We can denote 𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐1 as 𝑀𝑅𝐴1, the marginal revenue of crop 𝐴 using advanced 
technology, and  𝑒1 − 𝑒2 as 𝐼𝐴, the carbon emissions improvement of crop 𝐴. Then the 
conditions can be rewritten: 
𝑀𝑅𝐵4 − 𝑀𝑅𝐴1
𝑒4 − 𝐼𝐴
 < 𝑀 <
𝑐3 − 𝑐4
𝑒4−𝑒3
So if the carbon price can compensate the difference between the marginal 
revenue of two strategies, farmers will choose positive emitting strategies with advanced 
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technology rather than bioenergy. To avoid this unpleasant result, we need to set 
boundaries for carbon price. 
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5. EMPIRICAL MODEL
In this section, we are going to demonstrate our results from the previous section 
using an empirical mathematical programming model. We will set up this model with 
parameter values that are specified based on a case of emissions reductions in rice 
production for the emitter situations and the use of switchgrass for electricity generation 
for the negative emitter. Relevant data are collected from the Economic Research 
Service (ERS) Website and the studies mentioned below. 
5.1 Modeling Framework 
The objective function is as follows, covering all the possible formulas presented 
before: 
 Max    𝑝(𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3) − 𝑥1𝐶1(𝑥1) − (𝑥2 + 𝑥3)𝐶2(𝑥2 + 𝑥3)
− 𝑀[𝑥1(𝑒1 − 𝑒𝑏) + 𝑥2(𝑒2 − 𝑒𝑏) − 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 − 𝑒2𝑥3] 
s. t.  𝑥1𝑥2 = 0 
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ≥ 𝑥1
∗
𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 ≥ 0 
We can derive different results by changing the value of parameters in this 
function. For the no carbon market scenario, we set 𝑀 = 0. When analyzing the 
mandatory program, we use the conditions 𝑒𝑏 = 0, 𝑥3 = 0 and 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 = 𝑥1
∗𝑒1, where
𝑥1
∗ is the optimal we solved for when 𝑀 = 0. For the voluntary program, we can change
the setting into 𝑒𝑏 = 𝑒1, 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 = 0 and 𝑥3 = 0. The special payment for negative 
emitting strategies can be achieved by letting 𝑒𝑏 = 𝑒1 and 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 = 0. 
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As for the constraint 𝑥1𝑥2 = 0, it is more convenient for solving if we set up the 
constraint as follows: 
𝑥𝑖 − 𝐴𝑧𝑖 ≤ 0 
∑ 𝑧𝑖
𝑖
≤ 1   𝑖 = 1,2 
Here, 𝐴 is a positive constant and 𝑧𝑖 is a binary variable that only takes the value 
zero or one. The first equation makes sure that if 𝑥𝑖 takes a positive value, 𝑧𝑖 has to be 
one. The second equation shows that 𝑧1 and 𝑧2 cannot both be one which means that 
between 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 only one of them can be positive and the other one has to be zero. 
5.2 Model Setup 
As mentioned in the Commodity Costs and Returns data (USDA 2015), the 
average rice yield in the U.S. was 83 cwt per acre, with the price around $15.5 per cwt. 
From USDA (2015), we also know that the operating cost for rice is around $602 per 
acre and the allocated overhead cost including hired labor is about $413 per acre. Mid-
season drainage is a common mitigation practice for rice production. Pathak et al. (2012) 
showed that this practice will reduce emissions from 3 tons of CO2 equivalent per 
hectare to 2 tons of CO2 equivalent per hectare based on global warming potential. This 
practice also requires additional hired labor and extra commercial drying expenditure. 
Therefore, we can calculate all the parameters needed in the model on a per-ton basis. 
For the negative offsets case, we calculated the parameters based on switchgrass 
production. Duffy (2007) estimated the cost for switchgrass production, transportation, 
and storage in Iowa. Qin et al. (2006) used lifecycle analysis to estimate GHG emissions 
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mitigation from switchgrass based on different co-firing ratios. For the price of 
switchgrass, since the market is not yet well established, we used the price of hay as a 
substitute. Hay prices vary largely based on their quality and production area; here we 
use average auction prices in Iowa in 2008 for a better match with the cost data. The 
negative emitting case here is just a demonstration for the analytical part. Further data 
are needed for a more practical analysis. The following table shows all the parameters 
used in the model on a per-ton basis. 
Table 5.1 Value of parameters in empirical model. 
p 
($/ton) 
c1
($/ton) 
c2
($/ton) 
d 
($/ton) 
e1
(tCO2e/ton) 
e2
(tCO2e/ton) 
Positive emitter 276.78 218.57 224.18 1.25 0.2607 0.1732 
Negative emitter 160 113 117 1.5 -1.42 -1.47 
5.3 Model Results 
We run this model multiple times under different carbon prices ranging from 
zero to over 400. Then we can show the production practice shift and production level 
changes as carbon price increases; the results are listed below. 
5.3.1 Mandatory program 
For the positive emitting strategies, the farmer will choose to adopt the mitigation 
practice only when the carbon price is high enough. As the charts below show, Figure 
5.1 marks the level of 𝑥1 or 𝑥2 for the crop produced by the farmer, and Figure 5.2 gives 
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tons of CO2 equivalent emitted and the emissions under the baseline scenario, in which 
no carbon market exists. The horizontal axis is carbon price starting from zero. The 
critical value of carbon price is around $64.1 in this case. The production level is 
negatively correlated with carbon price. Therefore, the mandatory program will reduce 
carbon emissions at any price level, and the reductions are greatly increased beyond the 
critical price. 
Figure 5.1 Production of positive emitting strategies under mandatory program 
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Figure 5.2 Emission of positive emitting strategies under mandatory program 
Results for the negative emitter are shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4. The 
emissions reductions are not significant beyond the critical price, and the rest of the 
results are nearly the same. In the analytical part, we concluded that production level 
will decrease no matter what carbon price is, and total emissions will reduce in the 
mandatory program. Here our model results proved this conclusion. 
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Figure 5.3 Production of negative emitting strategies under mandatory program 
Figure 5.4 Emission of negative emitting strategies under mandatory program 
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5.3.2 Voluntary program 
In the voluntary program, the minimum payment farmers can receive is zero 
when they do not participate. So GHG emissions will remain unchanged if the carbon 
price is not high enough for farmers to adopt the mitigation alternatives. But beyond that 
point, the production level is positively correlated with carbon price, making the rebound 
effect possible. In this case, the rebound effect takes place as the payment gets larger 
than the amount that induced production of 𝑥1. In particular, as the payment rises, 𝑥2 
gets larger, and while the emissions per acre are reduced relative to the baseline, the total 
emissions start to rise, erasing some of the anticipated gain. Then when the carbon price 
reaches $400, total emissions actually exceed those in the baseline. Again this result is 
consistent with what we have shown before. 
Figure 5.5 Production of positive emitting strategies under voluntary program 
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Figure 5.6 Emission of positive emitting strategies under voluntary program 
In Figure 5.5, when farmers choose to produce 𝑥2, the production of 𝑥2 equals 
that of 𝑥1 in the baseline. It is easy to see in Figure 5.6 that the largest reduction occurs 
right after the strategy shift. Additional carbon price will only lead to production 
expansion and greater total emissions. When the carbon price is above $400, the total 
emissions from the practice exceed the baseline amount in Figure 5.6 
For the negative emitter, the voluntary program limits practice adoption. So the 
production level only increases a little. In Figure 5.7, we rescale the vertical axis in order 
to show the changes since they are smaller in range. Therefore, it is not shown in Figure 
5.7 that production level is zero for 𝑥1 and 𝑥2. 
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Figure 5.7 Production of negative emitting strategies under voluntary program 
The emissions reduction is also not significant, as we can see from Figure 5.8. 
Figure 5.8 Emission of negative emitting strategies under voluntary program 
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5.3.3 Special payment for negative emitter 
As we discussed before, as well as is shown by the model results, the voluntary 
program does not provide enough support for negative emitting strategies. So we need to 
design a special payment that pays for the total emissions amount instead of emissions 
status improvement when the participating land exceeds that in the baseline. We run the 
model again under the formula presented in the analytical section; the results are shown 
below. Both production level and emissions reductions increase dramatically within the 
same price range, and 𝑥3 is brought into the optimal solution when carbon price is high 
enough to adopt the mitigation practice. Therefore, the special payment is effective to 
encourage GHG mitigation practices. 
Figure 5.9 Production of negative emitting strategies under voluntary program with 
special payment design 
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Figure 5.10 Emission of negative emitting strategies under voluntary program with 
special payment design 
As showed in Figure 5.9, under this payment setting, farmers will adopt 
mitigation practices at a very small carbon price. In this case the critical value is 
𝑀 = 14.64 
In Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10 the production level and emissions reductions 
greatly increase compared with the voluntary payment design without this incentive for 
additional production. This result proves that the special payment is helpful to encourage 
the production of negative emitter. 
5.3.4 Comparison between programs 
Now we can compare mandatory and voluntary programs based on their 
emissions reductions performance. 
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First we will look at the program effect on emitters. From Figure 5.11, we can 
see that the mandatory program surely has a larger emissions reduction at all carbon 
prices for positive emitters, and it does not show a rebound effect after the critical price. 
We also see emissions reductions for low carbon prices. Meanwhile in the voluntary 
program, the reduction amount reaches its maximum level at the critical price, which 
provides us an insight on desired carbon price design for the program. 
Figure 5.11 Comparison of emission for positive emitting strategies 
The emissions reduction in the mandatory program comes from substantial 
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is the overall production level instead of practice chosen. Therefore the advantage of the 
mandatory program might be overestimated if we take into consideration a certain 
minimum production requirement. In addition, the mandatory program payment equals 
the product of reduction amount and carbon price, which also escalates as carbon price 
increases. 
Figure 5.12 Comparison of production for positive emitting strategies 
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payment scenario exhibit gains almost as large as those under the mandatory program. 
Under higher carbon prices showed in Figure 5.14, after mandatory and voluntary 
programs reach their critical price, which is around $80, they all achieve an 
improvement in emissions offset amount. And the mandatory program has the same 
emissions amount as the voluntary program with special payment. 
Figure 5.13 Comparison of emission for negative emitting strategies at lower carbon 
price levels 
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Figure 5.14 Comparison of emission for negative emitting strategies at higher carbon 
price levels 
This result proves that the special payment design for negative emitting strategies 
will bring significant emissions reductions under a voluntary program format. 
5.3.5 Adding constraints 
Two types of constraints have been discussed to prevent the rebound effect and 
increase the additional amount for negative emitters. Here we will examine the outcomes 
of these constraints. 
In order to avoid the rebound effect, we can limit carbon price within a range so 
that farmers cannot receive incentives for their additional production, or we can restrict 
the production directly. Certain forms of constraint have been designed in the analytical 
part and in Figure 5.15 are the results. 
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Figure 5.15 Comparison of emission for positive emitting strategies under two types of 
constraints 
Before the critical value of carbon price, all three scenarios have the same 
emissions amount, which is the baseline amount because 𝑥1 is the driver in this price 
range. After that, the production constraint has the best mitigation performance. The 
price constraint limits emissions amount below the baseline level. But the emissions 
reduction decreases when carbon price continues to increase. The power of the price 
constraint only reveals itself when carbon price is high enough to trigger the rebound 
effect. Because carbon price is unlikely to reach $400 per ton in reality, the production 
constraint might be a necessary part of the voluntary program. 
For the negative emitters, we need to examine the effect of constraints on 
encouraging production expansion. The production constraint does not provide any limit 
or incentive for strategies with negative emissions, which makes it neutral in the 
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voluntary program. On the other hand, the price constraint dampens the effect of the 
program because it stops carbon price from increasing. 
From these results, we can draw the conclusion that price constraint is less 
beneficial than production constraint for its limited power on preventing rebound effect 
and its negative influence on encouraging production of negative emitters. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Agricultural mitigation practices may be a tool for use in achieving U.S. GHG 
net emissions reductions. But the agricultural sector has not yet been covered in 
currently existing carbon programs. Emissions reductions from agriculture have not been 
widely eligible for trading in carbon markets. Voluntary contracts between private 
parties and government are common in the agricultural sector; however, voluntarily 
involved programs may either cause total emissions to increase through a rebound or 
leakage effect or can reduce incentives to expand negative emissions, decreasing the 
potential magnitude of the offset. 
In this study, we reviewed the issues of GHG emissions and potential carbon 
market designs. We also analyzed the underlying mechanisms of this program and 
derived conditions under which the rebound and negative emissions dampening effects 
will take place. Further, we came up with constraints that prevent this effect and 
program design elements that overcome these difficulties. Namely, we limit the 
voluntary participation of emitters to the level they experienced in the baseline and 
insure for negative emitters that the volume subject to the regional offset plus non-
participants equals the activity in the baseline. We also make it possible to encourage 
negative strategies production to the baseline amount for those not currently enrolled to 
receive the full benefit if they decide to participate. 
The empirical model results reinforce our analytical findings and show that 
production constraints are much more effective than price constraints. Therefore, a 
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production constraint on positive emitting strategies, like rice, might be a necessary part 
of the program. And the special payment design for negative emitting strategies should 
also be taken into consideration for its significant effect on encouraging mitigation 
practices.  
To apply the production constraint in the program design, one possible way is to 
limit the land or production enrollment to the levels in the baseline where no incentives 
are provided. The rebound effect will not take place because the additional production 
cannot receive payment from the program and the unintended consequence will be 
blocked. To apply the special payment design for negative emitting strategies, one needs 
to pay for the emissions improvement amount up to the baseline production level and the 
full offset amount for production beyond the baseline preventing the unintended 
dampening effect in that case. 
  
60 
REFERENCES 
Antle, J., and B. McCarl. 2003. “The Economics of Carbon Sequestration in Agricultural 
Soils.” In T. Tietenberg and H. Folmer, ed. International Yearbook of 
Environmental and Resource Economics. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 
278-310. 
California Air Resources Board. 2014. Assembly Bill 32 Overview. Air Quality Branch 
Sacramento. Available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011/cap_trade_overview.pdf. Accessed at 
February 20, 2016. 
–––. 2015a. Compliance Offset Protocol Rice Cultivation Projects. Air Quality Branch 
Sacramento. Available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/protocols/rice/riceprotocol2015.pdf. 
Accessed at February 20, 2016. 
–––. 2015b. Compliance Offset Protocol U.S. Forest Projects. Air Quality Branch 
Sacramento. Available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/protocols/usforest/forestprotocol2015.pdf. 
Accessed at February 20, 2016. 
Duffy, M. 2007. “Estimated Costs for Production, Storage, and Transportation of 
Switchgrass.” Iowa State University Extension Report. A1-22. 
Fargione, J., J. Hill, D. Tilman, S. Polasky, and P. Hawthorne. 2008. “Land Clearing and 
the Biofuel Carbon Debt.” Science 319(5867):1235-1238. 
61 
Gillingham, K., D. Rapson, and G. Wagner. 2015. “The Rebound Effect and Energy 
Efficiency Policy.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 10(1):68-88. 
Greening, L. A., D. Greene, and C. Difiglio. 2000. “Energy Efficiency and Consumption 
— the Rebound Effect — a Survey.” Energy Policy 28(6-7):389-401. 
 Gustavsson, L., K. Pingoud, and R. Sathre. 2006. “Carbon Dioxide Balance of Wood 
Substitution: Comparing Concrete- and Wood-Framed Buildings.” Mitigation 
and Adaptation Strategy for Global Change 11(3):667-691. 
Horowitz, J., and J. Gottlieb. 2010. The role of agriculture in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, EB-15. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2007. Climate Change 2007: 
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
–––. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of 
Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Kimble, J., R. Lal, and R. Follett. 2002. Agricultural Practices and Policies for Carbon 
Sequestration in Soil. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Kollmuss, A., M. Lazarus, C. Lee, M. LeFranc, and C. Polycarp. 2010. Handbook of 
Carbon Offset Programs: Trading Systems, Funds, Protocols and Standards. 
London, UK: Earthscan. 
62 
Lewandrowski, J., M. Peters, C. Jones, R. House, M. Sperow, M. Eve, and K. Paustian. 
2004. Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector. 
Washington DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 
TB-1909. 
Lobell, D., U. Baldos, and T. Hertel. 2013. “Climate Adaptation as Mitigation: the Case 
of Agricultural Investments.” Environmental Resource Letter 8(1):015012. 
Lutsey, N., and D. Sperling. 2008. “America's Bottom-Up Climate Change Mitigation 
Policy.” Energy Policy 36(2):673-685. 
Lyon, T. P. 2003. “Voluntary versus Mandatory Approaches to Climate Change 
Mitigation.” Resources for the Future Issues Brief 03-01. Available at 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-IB-03-01.pdf. 
Accessed at April 27, 2016. 
Marland, G., and B. Schlamadinger. 1997. “Forests for Carbon Sequestration or Fossil 
Fuel Substitution? A Sensitivity Analysis.” Biomass and Bioenergy 13(6):389-
397. 
McCarl, B.A. 2008a. “Bioenergy in a Greenhouse Mitigating World.” Choices 23(1):31-
33. 
–––. 2008b. “Lifecycle Carbon Footprint, Bioenergy and Leakage: Empirical 
Investigations.” Paper Presented at the Lifecycle Carbon Footprint of Biofuels 
conference, Miami FL, 29 January. 
63 
McCarl, B.A., D.M. Adams, R.J. Alig, and J.T. Chmelik. 2000. “Competitiveness of 
Biomass‐Fueled Electrical Power Plants.” Annals of Operations 
Research 94(1):37-55. 
McCarl, B., C. Peacocke, R. Chrisman, C. Kung, and R. Sands. 2009. “Economics of 
Biochar Production, Utilization and Greenhouse Gas Offsets.” In J. Lehmann and 
S. Joseph, ed. Biochar for Environmental Management: Science and Technology. 
London, UK: Earthscan, pp. 341-356. 
McCarl, B., and U. Schneider. 2001. “The Cost of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in U.S. 
Agriculture and Forestry.” Science 294(21):2481-2482. 
–––. 2000. “U.S. Agriculture's Role in a Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation World: 
An Economic Perspective.” Review of Agricultural Economics 22(1):134-159. 
Millar, N., G. Robertson, P. Grace, R. Gehl, and J. Hoben. 2010. “Nitrogen Fertilizer 
Management for Nitrous Oxide (N2O) Mitigation in Intensive Corn (Maize) 
Production: An Emissions Reduction Protocol for U.S. Midwest Agriculture.” 
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 15(2):185-204. 
Murray, B., B. McCarl, and H. Lee. 2004. “Estimating Leakage from Forest Carbon 
Sequestration Programs.” Land Economics 80(1):109-204. 
Pathak, H., B. Chakrabarti, A. Bhatia, N. Jain, and P.K. Aggarwal. 2012. “Potential and 
Cost of Low Carbon Technologies in Rice and Wheat Systems: A Case Study for 
the Indo-Gangetic Plains.” In H. Pathak and P.K. Aggarwal, ed. Low carbon 
technologies for agriculture: a study on rice and wheat systems in the Indo-
64 
 
Gangetic Plains. New Delhi, Indian: Indian Agricultural Research Institute, pp. 
12-40. 
Price, L. 2005. “Voluntary Agreements for Energy Efficiency or GHG Emissions 
Reduction in Industry: An Assessment of Programs around the World.” Paper 
Presented at ACEEE Summer Study on Energy Efficiency in Industry, West 
Point NY, 1 June. 
Qin, X., T. Mohan, M. El-Halwagi, G. Cornforth, and B. McCarl. 2006. “Switchgrass as 
an Alternate Feedstock for Power Generation: An Integrated Environmental, 
Energy and Economic Life-Cycle Assessment.” Clean Technologies and 
Environmental Policy 8(4):233-249. 
Searchinger, T., R. Heimlich, R. Houghton, F. Dong, A. Elobeid, J. Fabiosa, S. Tokgoz, 
D. Hayes, and T. Yu. 2008. “Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases 
Greenhouse Gases through Emissions from Land-Use Change.” Science 
319(5867):1238-1240. 
Smith, P., D. Martino, Z. Cai, D. Gwary, H. Janzen, P. Kumar, B. McCarl, S. Ogle, F. 
O’Mara, and C. Rice. 2007. “Policy and Technological Constraints to 
Implementation of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Options in Agriculture.” 
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 118(1-4):6-28. 
Smith, P., D. Martino, Z. Cai, D. Gwary, H.H. Janzen, P. Kumar, B.A. McCarl, F. 
O'Mara, C.W. Rice, R. Scholes, O. Sirotenko, M. Howden, T. McAllister, S.M. 
Ogle, G. Pan, V. Romanenkov, U.A. Schneider, S. Towprayoon, M. Wattenbach, 
65 
and J.E. Smith. 2008. “Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in Agriculture.” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 363(1492): 789-813. 
UNFCCC. 1997. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. Kyoto. Available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. Accessed February 20, 2016. 
–––. 2015. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in 
Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015. Addendum Part two: Action 
taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session. Available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf. Accessed February 
20, 2016. 
U.S. Congress, House of Representative. 2009. The American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009. Washington, DC: House Document 2454, 111th Cong., 1st 
sess., 29 June. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture 2015. Commodity Costs and Returns: U.S. and 
Regional Cost and Return Data, 2015. Washington, DC. Available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commodity-costs-and-returns.aspx. 
Accessed February 20, 2016. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2013. U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions. Washington, DC. Available at 
http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/pdf/2013_co2analysis.pdf. 
Accessed February 20, 2016. 
66 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2011. Accounting Framework for Biogenic CO2 
Emissions from Stationary Sources. Washington, DC. Available at 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/Biogenic-CO2-
Accounting-Framework-Report-Sept-2011.pdf. Accessed February 20, 2016. 
–––. 2015. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units. Washington, DC. Available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-06-18/pdf/2014-13726.pdf. Accessed 
February 20, 2016. 
